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The less developed countries (LDCs) are experiencing a process of rapid urbanisation.
The fraction of population living in urban areas in these countries increased from 17
to 37% between 1950 and 1990, and is expected to surpass the 50% mark before 2010.
By that time, 77% of the population in the more developed countries is expected to
be urban, still close to the 1990 figure of 73% (United Nations, 1991, table A.1).
The rates of urbanisation in the LDCs are, however, not exceptionally high by
historical standards. The ratio of urban to total population in the LDCs increased from
17 to 26% over the 25-year period from 1950 to 1975 (United Nations, 1991, table A.1).
That is the same increase experienced by now more developed countries over the last
quarter of the nineteenth century (Grauman, 1977; cited in Preston, 1979, p. 37).
While the percentage of urban population in the LDCs is getting closer to that of the
more developed countries, the pattern and size of urban agglomerations are diverging
from what can be observed in the more developed regions, and particularly in
European countries. During the last decades European urban systems have become
increasingly balanced, in the sense that the share of population living in their largest
cities has fallen. The urban sectors of LDCs have instead been absorbed by their largest
cities. In their classic study, Rosen and Resnick (1980) calculate several measures of
urban primacy for the city size distributions of 44 countries (the exponents of Pareto
distributions
[1], and also the ratio of each country’s largest city to the sum of the
population of the top five or the top 50 cities). They then investigate several factors
to which urban primacy may be related, and show that countries that are less
developed, have lower transport costs, or export a smaller fraction of their Gross
National Product (GNP) tend to have a larger degree of primacy.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a formal framework suggestive of some
factors that could help explain why more developed, and particularly European,
countries have in general developed more balanced systems of cities than LDCs. The
1 The size distribution of cities is the subject of a massive literature, a large part of which
emphasises the ‘rank-size’ rule: in many countries the number of cities with a population larger than
S is approximately proportional to S
–p, where the p (the exponent of this Pareto distribution) is close
to 1. This regularity was brought to the general attention by Zipf (1949) and has given rise to an
extensive amount of work (see Carroll, 1982, for a survey; Sheppard, 1982, for a critical account of the
literature on city size distributions; and Richardson, 1978, for a review of proposed theoretical
explanations for the rank-size rule).model proposed emphasises the trade-off between increasing returns and transport
costs, traditionally highlighted by central place theory. Lösch (1940), developing the
work of Christaller (1933), already describes the distribution of economic activity as
a compromise between maximising the number of firms operating in a market
(presumably because of some form of aggregate increasing returns) and minimising
transport costs (see Mulligan, 1984, for a review of the literature on central place
theory, and Henderson, 1972, for a critical evaluation of this theory).
Urban economists have built on a similar tension between agglomeration and
dispersion forces, but have generally stressed commuting costs and congestion rather
than transport costs as the main factor limiting urban growth. The distinction can be
regarded as a historical one: commuting costs, land rents and pollution have gained
importance recently, while during early urbanisation it was mainly the need to serve
activities, such as agriculture, which make use of dispersed resources that constrained
city growth.
This paper looks mainly at the early stages of urbanisation, so it focuses on the
costs of serving remote areas as the main force limiting agglomeration. It also argues
that the costs of spatial interaction, and more generally the conditions under which
early urbanisation takes place, may determine urban patterns even after those
conditions change. The main reason for this is the existence of multiple equilibria in
the location of economic activity, which arise from circular causation in the location
decisions of agents: firms and workers tend to locate close to large markets, which are
in turn those where more firms and workers locate (there is a variety of concepts
related to this argument, such as Perroux’s, 1955, ‘growth poles’, Myrdal’s, 1957,
‘circular and cumulative causation’, or Hirshman’s, 1958, ‘forward and backward
linkages’, although its application to regional growth is usually associated with Pred,
1966).
These concepts, while extremely insightful, have found it hard to make their way
into mainstream economic theory. Increasing returns to scale are essential for
explaining the geographical distribution of economic activities (Scotchmer and Thisse,
1992, call this the ‘Folk Theorem of Spatial Economics’). However, it is only recently
that developments in industrial organisation and trade theory have produced the tools
to deal with increasing returns and imperfect competition in a tractable way. Of
2course, there are ways to get around imperfect competition, the most common of
which is to rely on pure externalities to deal with agglomeration within a perfectly
competitive framework. This strategy has yielded very useful insights on issues like
why there are cities of different sizes and functions, notably in the work of Henderson
(1974, 1988). The down side of relying solely on pure external economies is that one
cannot relate the strength of agglomeration forces to micro features of the economy.
Recent work by Fujita, Krugman, Venables and others has been particularly useful
for understanding how the balance between agglomeration and dispersion forces
relates to microeconomic conditions (Fujita, 1988, 1989; Krugman, 1991a, 1991b, 1993a;
Venables, 1996; Krugman and Venables, 1995a, 1995b, 1996; see Fujita and Thisse,
1996, for a very insightful review of this work). This line of work has also helped
emphasise physical space and the relative location of cities (Fujita and Krugman, 1995;
Fujita, Krugman and Mori, 1995).
This paper builds on that framework, and is most closely related to Krugman
(1991b). He combines a monopolistically competitive manufacturing sector employing
mobile workers with a perfectly competitive agricultural sector employing immobile
farmers. That paper shows how the interplay between increasing returns, transport
costs, and inter-city migration can create a tendency for the spatial agglomeration of
manufacturing activities. While that gives us a useful starting point, the rapid
expansion of urban relative to rural population everywhere suggests that to study
urbanisation patterns one ought to look not only at inter-city migration but also at
rural-urban migration. This is particularly important if one wants to analyse the
differences in urbanisation patterns between European countries and LDCs.
Development economists (e.g., Rosenstain-Rodan, 1943; Lewis, 1954) have long
stressed that the elasticity of labour supply is much higher in LDCs than in more
developed countries, and that this can affect the incentives for industrialisation. In
order to study the effects of different elasticities of labour supply on urban patterns,
this paper avoids the simplifying assumption that manufacturing and agriculture use
totally different factors. It assumes instead that agriculture uses both land and labour,
and that workers move in response to differences in welfare levels both across sectors
and across regions.
3The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section sets up a two-
region general equilibrium model. Section 3 characterises its equilibria and shows how
the emergence of balanced or primate urban patterns are related to transport costs,
the degree of economies of scale, the strength of demand linkages, and the elasticity
of factor supplies. A final section summarises the main conclusions.
2. The model
Consider an economy with two regions, labelled 1 and 2, and a total population of L
workers. Each region consists of one possible location for a city and an agricultural
hinterland, which has K units of arable land. Each worker is endowed with one unit
of labour and is employed in one of two sectors, urban manufacturing (U) or rural
agriculture (R), in one of the two regions. Let LU,i and LR,i denote respectively urban






The distribution of workers between regions and sectors is endogenous and may
change over time through a migration process described below.
Preferences
Consumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences over a constant elasticity of substitution
aggregate of differentiated manufactured goods and a homogeneous agricultural
good. Let γ denote the share of manufactures in expenditure. The indirect utility








4for s = U, R, and i = 1, 2. Wages in sector s of region i are denoted ws,i, pA,i is the local



























for i ≠ j. This price index depends on the price of individual varieties and on
interregional transport costs; pM,j,i(h) denotes the free on board price for sales in region
i of variety h manufactured in region j, and Ni is the (endogenously determined) set
of varieties produced at equilibrium in region i. Parameter σ(>1) is the elasticity of
substitution across varieties. Transport costs for manufactures take Samuelson’s (1954)
‘iceberg’ form, so they are incurred in the product itself: τ units have to be shipped
so that one unit reaches the other region. These are broadly defined transport costs,
which represent not just physical transport costs but more generally the costs of doing
business across regions. Landowners have the same preferences as workers, but are
tied to their land.
[2]
Rural agriculture
Agriculture is perfectly competitive. It produces under constant returns to scale a
homogenous output, which is costlessly tradeable and will be the numéraire. In each
region the agricultural production function is Cobb-Douglas in land and labour, with
labour share θ. Agricultural output is LR,i
θ Ki







2 Dispersion forces in the model do not rely on this assumption. Even if land rents were not spent
locally, the spatial dispersion of agricultural land ensures that there are agricultural workers (and
therefore some local expenditure on manufactures) everywhere.
5Urban manufacturing
Manufactures are produced with increasing returns to scale in a monopolistically
competitive industry of the Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) type. The total
cost of producing a quantity xi(h) of variety h in city i is
(5) C
i(h) w
i α β x
i(h).
Production of manufactures therefore involves a fixed labour requirement, α, and a
constant variable labour requirement, β. There is free entry and exit in the
manufacturing industry so, although firms exercise monopoly power, at equilibrium
profits are dissipated.
Migration
Workers migrate in response to differences in welfare levels, so at steady state indirect
utility —as given by expression (2)— is equated across sectors and regions. Off steady
state, migration is assumed to follow the dynamics process
(6) ˙ L
s,i λ

















for s = U, R, and i = 1, 2, where λ > 0. This particular process can be justified by the
following set of assumptions. Opportunities to migrate to sector s of region i arrive
at Poisson rate ρLU,i.
[3] When the opportunity arises, a worker migrates only if the
utility level of the representative worker in the sector and region of destination is
higher than his or her own present utility by a factor of at least c. The idiosyncratic
cost of migration c is randomly drawn from a distribution with density function
dF(c)=1 / δc in the interval 1,e
δ, and zero elsewhere. Therefore, the probability that
a worker migrates from sector s in region i to sector r in region j when the
opportunity arises is Prob(c < Vs,i/Vr,j)=λLn(Vs,i/Vr,j), where λ≡ρ /δ >0 . N e t
immigration in sector s of region i then follows the dynamic process described by (6).
3 This is meant to reflect that, as already noted by Ravenstein (1885, p. 199), migrants ‘generally
go by preference to one of the great centres of commerce or industry’.
6However, any other dynamic process such that workers move to jobs with higher
associated utility levels, and such that steady state utility levels are equalised across
sectors and regions would yield the same analytical results.
General equilibrium
Firms sell in each region, and perceive a constant own price elasticity of σ in every
market. They therefore price output at a constant relative markup over marginal cost.
The profit maximising producer price of manufactures is then identical for all varieties







With profits dissipated by free entry and exit, the equilibrium level of output is the





Substituting expression (8) into (5) gives the cost for a firm producing in city i as
Ci = wU,i ασ. Urban employment (the population size of city i) is then, by Shephard’s
lemma, proportional to the number of firms in city i (more precisely, to the mass of










Consumers spend a fraction γ of their income on manufactures, so total expenditure









The first term inside the brackets is the income of urban workers, and the second is
the sum of the income of rural workers and land rents. The demand for an individual

















i ≤ x , n
i ≥ 0,
for i = 1, 2, closes the short-run equilibrium of the model.
Without loss of generality, let us choose units such that prices equal wages
(βσ = σ– 1), and scale firms such that they earn zero profits at size 1 (achieved by
choosing units such that α =1 / σ). Then, substituting expressions (7) and (9) into (3)
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Given an allocation of population across sectors {LU,1, LU,2, LR,1, LR,2}, for known
parameters γ,µ ,σ and τ, the short-run equilibrium of the model is a set of wages and
price indices {wU,1, wU,2, wR,1, wR,2, q1, q2} solution to equations (10), (13), and (14) valued
for each of the two regions. Wages and price indices determine short-run welfare
levels —indirect utility, as given by expression (2). If these differ across sectors,
regions, or both, then migration will make the allocation of population change over
time according to the simultaneous differential equation system of expression (6).
In order to understand the location forces captured in the model, it is useful to
consider the following (thought) experiment: if an additional worker locates in a city,
how does this affect the profitability of local firms and the welfare of local workers?
Two types of effects can be distinguished: competition and linkage effects.
Competition effects arise as the presence of an additional firm increases competition
for the local market, thereby lowering the wage that firms in that city can pay without
8making losses —expression (14). This tends to drive workers out of the city,
eliminating differences in city size. Pushing in the opposite direction there are linkage
effects, which encourage workers and firms to agglomerate. A larger number of
workers brings a larger local expenditure, enabling firms to pay higher nominal
wages, and making the location more attractive for other workers and firms. A larger
number of local workers and firms also implies more locally produced varieties, a
lower price index, and hence higher welfare, attracting more workers into the city and
into the surrounding hinterland —expressions (2) and (3).
The next section shows how the level of transport costs, the degree of economies
of scale, the share of urban goods in consumer expenditure, and the elasticity of
labour supply to the urban sector with respect to rural wages affect the relative
strength of competition and linkage effects. Where linkages dominate, the economy
ends up developing a primate city. Where competition effects dominate, a balanced
urban system tends to emerge.
3. Urbanisation patterns
Let us start by characterising the equilibria of the model in terms of the level of
transport costs, and move on to economies of scale and labour supply later on in this
section. Transport costs have been falling over time (according to Mokyr, 1990,
transport costs for goods fell by 0.88% a year during the first half of the nineteenth
century, a decline that accelerated to 1.5% a year after 1850). The first aim of this
section is to study the effects of this fall in transport costs on urban patterns. Let us
consider two types of candidate equilibria of the model. The first is an equilibrium
with a balanced urban system, characterised by two cities of equal size, each with an
equally populated agricultural hinterland. The second is a pair of equilibria with a
unique primate city (there is a pair of equilibria of this type because the primate city
can be either in region 1 or in region 2).
9Balanced urban systems
Imagine first a situation where transporting goods is so costly that regions are
essentially autarchic. Without differences in technology or land endowments, the two
regions in our model must be identical. Now think of a gradual reduction in transport
costs over time. With high but finite transport costs, some intraindustry trade takes
place between cities. However, the only stable equilibrium of the model is still
characterised by a balanced urban system, where each of the two cities has the same









2 γ θ(1 γ )
,










2 γ θ(1 γ )
.
Representing the dynamics of the model graphically is not easy. There are four
state variables in our system of differential equations: the urban and rural populations
in each of the two regions. Total population is held constant (under the assumptions
of the model, the equilibrium share of workers in each sector of each region is
independent of the size of population), so only three of these variables are
independent; let us focus on LU,1, LU,2, and LR,1. This would suggest drawing a three-
dimensional figure with LU,1, LU,2, and LR,1 relative to total population on the axes.
However, three-dimensional figures turn out not to be very helpful in this context. Yet
they can be simplified by taking advantage of the fact that all stable equilibria of the
model lie in the plane LU,1 + LU,2 +2 LR,1 = L (see equations (15) and (16) above, and
(28) and (29) below). Figure 1 has been computed by taking a grid of points on the
intersection of that plane with the unit simplex, and plotting a field of vectors, each
of which has its tail on a point of the grid, is tangent to the phase path crossing that
point, and has module proportional to the speed of convergence to steady state at that
4 The simplest way to calculate these fractions is to choose units such that at the balanced cities
equilibrium wi = qi = Vi = 1, and ni = 1/(1 + τ
(1-σ)), ∀i. Expressions (15) and (16) then follow directly
from (4), (10), (13) and (14).
10point. Figure 2 projects the vector field of figure 1 on a plane perpendicular to the LR,1
FIGURE 1
Urbanisation dynamics with high transport costs on the plane of equilibria
axis, which gives a two-dimensional representation of the dynamics of the model.
Figures 1 and 2 are drawn for parameter values γ = 0.5, θ = 0.5, σ = 6, and τ = 2.6.
At the unique globally stable equilibrium (labelled B in figure 2), each of the two
cities absorbs one third of total population —as given by expression (15). Although
the size of rural population in each region is not visible in the two-dimensional
projection, expression (16) shows that one sixth of total population lives in the
hinterland of each city at equilibrium.
11This ‘balanced cities’ equilibrium remains stable as long as transport costs are











Urbanisation dynamics with high transport costs
higher than some critical level, making it more profitable to supply rural areas from
a close-by city. This critical level can be determined by linearising the migration
dynamics in the neighbourhood of the balanced cities equilibrium, and using (4), (10),
(13), and (14).
[5] The balanced cities equilibrium is a stable node for values of





















5 For details of the derivation of such critical level in this kind of model see Puga (1996).






(valued at equilibrium and in absolute value). When transport costs fall below this
critical value, the balanced cities equilibrium becomes saddle-path unstable. What
drives the change? The balanced cities equilibrium is stable if and only if a
(hypothetical) relocation of a worker, say, from city 2 to city 1 reduces the real wages
of workers in 1 (leading to emigration and firm exit), and increases the real wages of
workers in 2 (leading to immigration and firm entry); it is unstable if the reverse is
true. By relocating from city 2 to city 1, a worker raises the number of varieties
produced in 1, increasing competition for the urban and rural markets of region 1
(and reducing competition for region 2’s markets), thereby lowering the wage that
local firms can afford to pay in 1 without making losses. When transport costs are
high this effect dominates, workers and firms are split between the two cities, and
markets are served mainly on a local basis. When instead transport costs are low,
firms can compete in distant markets without producing locally. The relocation of a
worker from city 2 to city 1 then has little effect on competition but, by lowering the
price index in region 1 and increasing it in 2, it raises relative real wages in city 1 and
its hinterland, attracting migrants from region 2. Immigration also increases local
demand, making local firms able to pay higher wages, which provides further
incentives for immigration. The more workers and firms that move, the more
attractive it is to do so, and this process of circular causation leads to the emergence
of a primate city.
[6]
A primate city
When transport costs fall below the critical level of expression (17), what do the
ensuing equilibria look like? Figure 3 is drawn for the same parameter values as
6 Several papers written in the early 1980’s (in particular, three papers reviewed by Dendrinos
and Rosser, 1992: Casetti, 1980; Dendrinos, 1980; and Papageorgiou, 1980) address the possibility of
sudden urban growth. Despite the differences with respect to the framework developed in this paper,
in all cases discontinuous changes in the equilibrium population distribution arise as the utility gap
between workers in A and workers in B passes from decreasing locally to increasing locally with
migration from A to B.
13figures 1 and 2, but with transport costs taking a value (τ = 1.3) below the critical












Urbanisation dynamics with low transport costs
level given by expression (16) (τB
* = 1.58). There are now two locally stable equilibria
(labelled P1 and P2), characterised by a single primate city —both are qualitatively
identical but with the role of the regions reversed.
These primate city equilibria are already stable before the balanced cities
equilibrium becomes saddle-path unstable. Therefore, there is some intermediate level
of transport costs for which, if there already is a well-developed system of cities, the
economy converges to the balanced cities equilibrium B; otherwise, a primate city
emerges as the economy converges to equilibria P1 or P2. This configuration with
multiple equilibria is represented in figure 4, drawn for τ = 1.7 —and all other
parameters as figures 1, 2 and 3. Again, it is possible to derive a condition on
parameters under which this configuration appears.
14Let us focus on equilibrium P1, noting that equilibrium P2 is identical but with













Urbanisation dynamics with intermediate transport costs
region labels reversed. At P1 there is no manufacturing production in region 2. This
is an equilibrium only if, when valued at P1, the real wages of a worker hired by a
firm relocating to city 2 are lower than real wages elsewhere in the economy, so the
first firm locating there would be unable to attract workers.
[7] Let us check when this
is the case. With all varieties of manufactures produced in city 1 the price indices in
the two regions are
7 There is a parallel between the derivation of the local stability condition for the primate city
outcome and Rosenstein–Rodan’s (1943) concept of the ‘big push’, formalised amongst others by
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989). According to this view, a firm that wants to settle in a new
location must pay high enough wages to attract agricultural workers into its factory. However, unless
it can generate enough demand for its production from sources other than its own workers it may not
be able to break even. As in the ‘big push’ literature, multiple equilibria are possible: if firms
producing different goods invest together, they can sell their output to each other’s workers; and,
although it may not have been individually profitable for each firm to make such an investment,










By expressions (11) and (19), the highest nominal wage that a deviant firm relocating
to region 2 can pay a worker without making losses compares to the nominal wage




























To turn nominal wages into real wages one must divide by the appropriate price
index (qi
γ). Using (19), then shows that the real wages of a worker hired by a firm
relocating to city 2 are lower than real wages elsewhere in the economy (so there is





































and V is the real wage achieved at equilibrium by any worker elsewhere in the
economy: V ≡ VU,1 = VR,1 = VR,2. The final step is to express the equilibrium shares of
manufacturing expenditure in each region as a function of parameters. At P1 city 1
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Finally, substituting expression (21) into (26) proves that there is a locally stable















(1 σ) 1 γ
1 τ
θγ/(1 θ) τ
(σ 1) ≤ 1.
Unlike in the balanced cities equilibrium case, turning expression (27) into a closed
form solution for the range of transport costs in which the primate city equilibria are
unstable appears to be impossible. Nevertheless, there are several things to be learnt
from this expression. First, as τ approaches 1 so does ν, and ∂ν/∂τ is negative for τ
close to 1. This implies that for sufficiently low transport costs there is a pair of locally
stable equilibria at P1 and P2. Second, as τ becomes infinitely large, so does ν,
provided that [σ(1 – γ)–1 ]–γθ/(1 – θ)>0 .
[8] So if economies of scale (which are
higher the lower is σ), the share of manufactures in consumer expenditure (γ), and
the share of labour in agricultural costs (θ) are not too large, the shape of ν as a
function of τ looks like in figure 5.
Denote by τP
* (= 2.23 in figure 5, drawn for the same parameter values as previous
figures) the level of transport costs at which ν = 1. For values of transport costs
higher than τP
* the balanced cities equilibrium is globally stable (as in figure 2). For
values between τP
* and τB
* —expression (17)— the balanced cities equilibrium and the
two primate city equilibria are locally stable (as in figure 4). For transport costs lower
than τP
*, the balanced cities equilibrium is saddle-path unstable and the two primate
8 If this condition is not satisfied, ν < 1 for all τ, and the critical value at which the symmetric
equilibrium switches from locally stable to unstable —expression (17)— is outside the interval (1,∞).
This corresponds to the case where economies of scale, the share of manufactures in expenditure, and
the share of labour in agricultural costs are so high that the balanced city equilibrium is unstable and
the primate city equilibria are stable for all values of transport costs.
17equilibria are locally stable (as in figure 3).
τ









Range of transport costs in which the primate city equilibrium is locally stable
Note that if there is no labour mobility across sectors (θ = 0, so all labour is
employed by manufacturing while agricultural production relies only on a sector-
specific factor), we are in the case studied by Krugman (1991b). When valued at θ =0 ,
expression (27) collapses to the analogous expression derived in that paper. Similarly,
valuing expression (17) at θ = 0 yields an analytical solution to the question of when
is an even distribution of manufacturing a stable equilibrium in Krugman’s (1991b)
paper —an issue which that paper only studies through numerical examples.
Considering this more general setup, where θ can take values other than zero and
where the distribution of labour across sectors is endogenous, will help us clarify
below the role of elastic factor supplies in the economics of agglomeration.
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This is because agricultural workers living close to the city can buy urban
manufactures at lower prices, so at equilibrium agricultural workers in 2 must make
up for it by producing with a lower labour/capital ratio, which gives them a higher
marginal productivity.
Note that the total size of the urban sector at steady state is the same in the
balanced cities equilibrium as in the primate city equilibria. This is because, starting
from any equilibrium of the model, intersectoral migration raises the utility of
workers in the sector that sees its size diminish and lowers the utility of workers in
the sector that sees its size increase, so the size of each sector tends to go back to its
equilibrium level.
The pecuniary externalities that lead to urban primacy in this model rely on three
crucial elements. The first is the existence of economies of scale internal to
manufacturing firms, which make them produce only in a few locations (in fact,
under the assumptions of the model each firm produces in a single location). The
second is some cost of spatial interaction, which encourages firms and workers to
choose locations that have comparatively good market access, which are in turn
locations where there are relatively many firms and workers. The third important
element is a sufficiently elastic supply of labour to the urban sector, so that the
emerging primate city can draw labour from other cities and especially from the pool
of agricultural workers. This last element has been largely ignored by recent location
models using the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz framework but is crucial: agglomeration can
occur only if increasing returns activities can draw resources either from other sectors
or from other regions.
19Primate cities emerge under some conditions and not under others because the
pecuniary externalities created by this combination of internal economies of scale,
transport costs, and elastic factor supplies must be set against the stronger
competition faced by firms in larger cities. The advantage of deriving pecuniary
externalities rather than assuming external economies is that one can study how their
strength varies relative to product market competition with the different conditions
under which urbanisation takes place.
Economies of scale, labour supply, and expenditure shares
So far this section has focused on the transport cost parameter τ, which can be
interpreted as a broad measure of the costs of spatial interaction. The results of this
paper suggest that transport costs can play an important role in determining the
pattern of urbanisation. High transport costs allow a balanced system of cities to
emerge, while low transport costs lead to urban primacy. Let us now look at the
effects of the degree of economies of scale, the share of urban goods in consumer
expenditure, and the elasticity of labour supply to the urban sector.
Differentiating expressions (17) and (27) —the latter valued at ν = 1, hence with
τ = τP

























Parameter σ has at least two interpretations. It is the elasticity of substitution across
varieties in consumer preferences. At equilibrium, it can also be seen as an inverse
measure of economies of scale —the ratio of average to marginal costs in the model
is σ/(σ–1). Quite intuitively, the tendency of firms to agglomerate in a single city
increases with economies of scale —or with a lower substitutability across products.
The lower the share of labour in agricultural production costs, θ, the more elastic
the supply of labour to the urban sector —expression (18). As shown above, the
interaction of increasing returns to scale, transport costs, and migration creates a
tendency for urban agglomeration. However, agglomeration can only occur if workers
can be drawn from elsewhere. The more elastic supply of labour to the urban sector,
20the easier it is to draw workers from agriculture without large increases in wages, and
the more likely that the economy ends up developing a primate urban pattern.
Finally, a larger share of manufactures in consumer expenditure also favours urban
primacy through two different channels. First, the weight of the price index of
manufactures in real wages increases with γ (in this sense, it is a measure of the
strength of demand linkages), encouraging workers to migrate into regions where
there are relatively many firms. Second, the elasticity of labour supply to the urban
sector increases with γ, helping a primate city emerge.
European vs. LDC urbanisation
These results may provide some insight into the differences between urbanisation in
Europe and in LDCs. European urbanisation took place mainly in the XIX century.
[9]
In XIX century Europe the costs of spatial interaction were higher, economies of scale
were weaker, and the pool of agricultural workers available to the urban sector was
smaller than in LDCs today. The model suggests that this could have helped European
countries develop balanced systems of cities.
Urbanisation in LDCs is taking place under lower costs of spatial interaction and
with stronger economies of scale than in XIX century Europe. This may help explain
the different early urbanisation patterns in Europe and in LDCs. However, while
transport costs in LDCs today are lower than in XIX century Europe, they are still
higher than in modern Europe. Why then have European countries not generally
developed primate urban patterns as well? A possible answer is that, in the presence
of multiple equilibria, temporary differences in the conditions under which
9 According to Bairoch (1988), between 1800 and 1900 the population of European cities increased
from 19 million to 108 million (from 12.1% to 38% of total population), compared with an increase from
8 million to 19 million (from 10.4% to 12.1% of total population) over the previous five centuries.
21urbanisation takes place can have permanent effects on urban patterns. However, the
main reason for the sustained differences in urban patterns is probably that there is
a much larger pool of agricultural workers available to migrate into the cities of
today’s LDCs than there was in XIX century Europe. Let us consider these two
arguments in turn.
Imagine two countries urbanising with a time lag between them, with transport
costs falling over time.
[10] Assume that urbanisation in one of these countries
(labelled ‘European’) starts when the level of transport costs is high, so the dynamics
of urbanisation are like those represented in figure 2. This ‘European’ country then
starts developing a balanced system of cities. When transport costs fall, transforming
the dynamics of urbanisation into those of figure 4, further urban growth in the
‘European’ country operates on a well-developed urban system (it is already within
the basin of attraction of the balanced cities equilibrium, marked with thin arrows in
figure 4), so its balanced urban pattern is preserved and even strengthened.
Now assume that, on the other hand, the second country (labelled ‘LDC’) only
experiences significant urban growth when transport costs have fallen to the range of
multiple equilibria, as depicted in figure 4. Then, even if the final conditions on
parameters are similar to those of the European economy, a quite different urban can
emerge. Thick arrows in figure 4 mark points from which a primate urban pattern
develops. The smaller the level of urbanisation when transport costs reach this level
(the closer {LU,1, LU,2} to the origin of the axes), the smaller the difference in city sizes
necessary for a primate city to emerge.
While multiple equilibria can provide a formal explanation to the persistence of
balanced urban systems in European countries despite falling transport costs, the main
explanation arising from this framework focuses on the different wage elasticity of
labour supply from agriculture to manufacturing.
The rise in the natural growth rate of population in LDCs lead to over a 250%
growth in agricultural population in LDCs between 1800 and 1980 (despite large rural-
urban migration flows, which made possible an increase in urban population by a
10 One can think of urbanisation in this context as triggered by the switch from a traditional
constant returns to scale technology to a modern increasing returns to scale technology in the
production of manufactures, in the tradition of the ‘big push’ literature.
22factor of 15 over the same period). Since in those 180 years the amount of cultivated
land rose by no more than 40%, agricultural population density almost trebled during
this period and by 1985 each agricultural worker in LDCs had an average of just 1.4
hectares of land at his disposal. This is in contrast with urbanisation in Europe, where
between 1800 and 1880 agricultural population rose by less than 35% while the
extension of cultivated land grew by 10-15%. Over the following three decades
European agricultural population grew very little, and after the 1920’s went into
decline. As a result, the land area available per agricultural worker in Europe rose
from 2.3 hectares in 1920 to around 4 hectares in 1980 (all data from Bairoch, 1988).
The increasing population density in rural areas in LDCs has prevented agricultural
productivity in these countries from reproducing the rise that accompanied XIX
century European urbanisation, despite large rural-urban migration flows. Partly as
a consequence of this different evolution of productivity in each sector, the gap
between urban and rural income in LDCs has widened over the last 40 years (see
Bairoch, 1988).
The results of this paper show that when large rural-urban migration flows have
a small impact on the rural-urban wage gap, primate city patterns tend to emerge. As
the costs of doing business at a distance fall, there is always a tendency for larger
cities to grow disproportionately more than smaller ones (the model shows how this
arises through a circular causation process whereby firms and workers tend to locate
close to large markets, which are in turn those where more firms and workers locate).
However, in order to grow cities need to attract workers, specially from rural areas.
If as agricultural workers flow into the larger cities the advantages of moving there
are reduced fast, balanced urban systems tend to arise, as has happened in Europe.
Instead, when migration does not have a strong negative impact on the incentives for
further migration population in large cities tends to build up, and primate cities
emerge as they have in LDCs.
234. Conclusions
The world’s largest metropolises are increasingly located in the poorest regions of the
world. The fraction of population living in urban areas in the less developed countries
(LDCs) is growing closer to that of the more developed regions. Yet the pattern and
size of urban agglomerations in the LDCs are diverging from what can be observed
in the more developed countries, and particularly in Europe. Despite the many
similarities in their urbanisation processes, while the balance between cities in
European countries remains and is even strengthening (their largest cities account for
a small and falling share of urban population), the growing urban sector of the LDCs
is instead being absorbed by its largest cities.
Many economic, geographic, historic, political, and social factors play a role in
explaining why some particular cities are larger than others. Yet one would like to
understand the effect of those economic forces that are not specific to each case, but
that describe a general trend. Our analysis highlights four such forces: the costs of
spatial interaction, the degree of economies of scale, the strength of demand linkages,
and the elasticity of labour supply to the urban sector with respect to rural wages, all
of which can play an important role in determining whether an economy develops a
balanced system of cities or a primate urban pattern.
In the proposed framework urban manufacturing and rural agriculture compete for
workers, which migrate across regions and sectors in response to differences in
welfare levels. The interaction between internal economies of scale, transport costs and
migration creates pecuniary externalities, which encourage manufacturing firms to
cluster in larger cities. On the other hand, the need to serve agricultural workers,
which make use of dispersed land, works against this tendency for primate cities and
favours balanced urban patterns.
Lower transport costs make it easier for firms to supply remote areas from large
cities, and can trigger a circular causation process that leads to urban primacy. The
tendency of firms to agglomerate in a primate city also increases with economies of
scale and with the strength of demand linkages. High transport costs, small economies
of scale, and weak linkages favour instead the emergence of a balanced system of
cities.
24These results may provide some insight into the differences between urbanisation
in Europe and urbanisation in LDCs. European urbanisation took place mainly in the
XIX century, when the costs of spatial interaction were higher and economies of scale
weaker than in today’s LDCs. This could help explain why European countries have
developed balanced urban systems while primate cities dominate in LDCs. In the
presence of multiple equilibria, these temporary differences in the conditions under
which early urbanisation took place in each case may have had permanent effects on
urban patterns.
The degree of openness of an economy also appears to play an important role in
explaining urban primacy: import substitution policies by LDCs made location in the
metropolis more important, while trade liberalisation has allowed firms to spread out.
It is easy to incorporate openness to trade into this framework, but it has been left
outside since Krugman and Livas (1996) already provide an elegant theoretical
justification, supported by empirical evidence from the Mexican case in Hanson
(forthcoming).
Another factor favouring urban primacy is the differential improvement of
infrastructure favouring the metropolis. LDCs have developed radial transport
networks centred on their primate cities much more often than European countries,
and perhaps this has exacerbated the tendency of LDCs to develop metropolis of
disproportionate size. This is what Krugman (1993b) calls the ‘hub effect’, and has
been explored in a urban context by Fujita and Mori (1996).
However, this paper stresses what may well be the main reason for the sustained
differences in urban patterns: there is a much larger pool of agricultural workers
available to migrate into the cities of today’s LDCs than there was in XIX century
Europe. As the costs of doing business at a distance fall, there is always a tendency
for larger cities to grow disproportionately more than smaller ones. However, for such
clustering to occur cities must be able to draw workers from other cities and from
agriculture without large increases in wages. If as agricultural workers flow into the
larger cities the advantages of moving there are reduced fast, balanced urban systems
tend to arise, as they have in Europe. Instead, when migration does not have a strong
negative impact on the incentives for further migration population in large cities tends
to build up, and primate cities emerge as they have in LDCs.
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